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RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY 

IN THE EAST 



BY 



MILIVOY S. STANOYEVICH, M. L. 

( University of California ) 




OAKLAND AND SAN FRANCISCO 

LIBERTY PUBLISHING COMPANY 

1916 



RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY 

IN THE EAST 



BY THE SAME AUTHOR. 



Omladina u Sadashnyosti. 
Veshtina Pisanya. 

Govorne Figure u Pesmama. 

(A prize essay). 

Prevodi u Srpskim Zabavnicitna. 

(A prize essay). 

Tolstoy's Theory of Social Reform. 

(A Master's thesis). 

Russian Foreign Policy in the East. 



Prussian foreign policy 



IN THE EAST 



BY 

MILIVOY S. STANOYEVICH, M. L. 

( University of California) 




OAKLAND AND SAN FRANCISCO 

LIBERTY PUBLISHING COMPANY 

1916 



CopsJ tt 



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Copyrioht, 1916 , 

BY LIBERTY PUBLISHING CO. 
OAKLAND. CAL. 



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PREFACE. 

Whoever has carefully considered the past and present 
of historical phenomena might certainly judge and conclude 
of the future political issues. To comprehend general Euro- 
pean politics, one should study the history of Eastern 
Europe, to wit, the history of Russia; and to undestand 
the Russian European history one must be intimate with 
Russian diplomatic activities in Asia, particularly in Far 
Asia. The aim of this condensed essay is to sketch Russian 
foreign policy in the East, from about the begining of the 
nineteenth century to the present time. The student of 
political questions who wish to grasp in extenso Russian and 
European politics, which, in recent tragic days is written, 
not by pen but by blood of our brothers and fathers, can 
not find sufficient data for his perusal in the following pa- 
ges. If such a student want to be informed of Russian 
internal and external policy from original sources and 
books more detailed and authoritative, he is advised to 
consult the documents and general works which are listed 
in the bibliography at the end of this monograph. 

I desire to acknowledge the invaluable aid for facts and 
ideas received from the writings of M. N. Pokrovskago. 
His illuminating book, Russkaya Istoriya s Drevnieyshih 
Vremen (Russian History from the oldest Times), and his 
brilliant articles in Istoriya Rossiyi v XI X Viekie (Histo- 
ry of Russia in the Nineteenth Century), offer mines of infor- 
mation, as well as a sympathetic interpretation of con- 
structive Russian politics. More particular gratitude has 
been richly merited by Dr. D. P. Barrows, Professor of 
Political Science in the University of California, and 



VI PREFACE 

Dr. Payson J. Treat, Professor of History in Stanford Uni- 
versity, for their acute observations and suggestions offered 
to me. Acknowledgments and sincere thanks are also due 
to Mr. Lewis Anderson, B.A., Miss Margaret Hodgen, B.L., 
and Dr. Frank F. Nalder, of the University of CaUfornia, 
for their kind assistance efficiently rendered in the reading 
and revising of proof. 

M.S.S. 
Berkeley, California. 
February 14, 1916. 



TABLE OF CONTENTS 



CHAPTER I 
Russia in the Near East. 

Three phases of Russia's expansion in the East — Decadence of Tur- 
key — Tsarigrad [Constantinoplfe] the metropolis of the Orthodox 
Church — Russian poUcy in the Near East from 1803 to 1812 — The 
AUiance between Russia, France, and Great Britain for hberation 
of Greece under the Turkish domination, 1827 — The Crimean 
War — The Epoch of the Great Reforms — The Russo-Turkish War 
of 1877 — Occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by Austria — An- 
nexation of these two provinces — Rivalry between Slavonic and 
Germanic powers in the Balkan Peninsula — The Balkan Alliance 
of 1912 — Serbia, Greece, Bulgaria, and Montenegro declare war on 
Turkey — The second Balkan War — The Treaty of Bucharest of 1913 
Russia's failure in the Balkans — Her gain in Asia. pp. 1-9. 

CHAPTER II 
Russia in the Middle East. 

Expansion of Russia toward the Arabian Sea — Annexation of Khiva, 
Bokhara and Caucasus — Russia's influence in Persia and Afghanistan — 
Collision with Great Britain in the Middle East — Germany's Drang 
nach Osten — The Bagdad Railroad — Russian and British spheres 
of interest in Persia — Entente cordiale between the two powers in 
Afghanistan — Criticism of the Anglo-Russian agreement in the Middle 
Orient — Renunciation of Russia from the Persian Gulf — Russia and 
England prior to the Convention of 1907 — Their policy after the 
Convention of 1907 — Persia and Afghanistan at the beginning of the 
European War of 1914 — Then- neutraHty. _ ___ pp. 10-16. 

CHAPTER III 
Russia in the Far East. 

Relation of Russia to the Far East — Muraviev-Amurski, governor 
of Eastern Siberia, 1847 — Annexation of the Amur and Maritime 
Province — Russian steamships in communication with Japan and 
U. S. of America — Russian trade in Mongolia and Chinese Turkestan — 
Formation of the Russo-Chinese Bank — Concessions in Manchuria 
— Russian policy and the Boxer rising in China — The Tsar protects 
"the Son of Heaven" — A secret agreement between Russia and 



VIII CONTENTS 

China — Japan and Russia in Manchuria — Russia and Japan in 
Korea — War between Russia and Japan. _pp. 17-22. 

CHAPTER IV 
Russian Policy after the Japanese War. 

A parallel between the Japanese and Russians in fight — Why did 
Japan succed? — The treaty of peace — Did Russia's poUcy fail in the 
Far East? — General characteristic of her foreign politics — Relation 
with MongoUa in the beginning of the twentieth century — Russia the 
protector of the Mongolian peoples — Her protection of the Slavonic 
peoples — Turning from the Far to the Near East — Liberation of the 
subjugated peoples from the Turkish yoke — Why is Russia in war 
with the Huns and Teutons? pp. 22-27. 

APPENDIX 
Bibliography pp. 29-38. 



RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY IN 
THE EAST. 



CHAPTER I 
RUSSIA IN THE NEAR EAST. 

From the beginning of the nineteenth century up to the 
present time, the foreign policy of Russia in the East has 
passed through three important stages. These three stages 
or phases of expansion may be focused respectively on 
the Aegean Sea, the Arabian Sea, and the Yellow Sea, or in 
other words, on the Near East, the Middle East, and the Far 
East. To secure the first outlet, Russian diplomats knew 
that the route lay through Constantinople and the Darda- 
nelles; to attain the second outlet, the way lead through 
Persia and Afghanistan; and to reach the third point, the 
route passed through Mongolia and Manchuria. The 
southward expansion toward the Mediterranean had 
sometimes a religious and idealistic aspect. Transcaucasian 
expansion had a commercial significance, and the eastward 
expansion a political aspect. Let us first consider the Russian 
foreign policy in the Near East. 



Since Russian expansion towards the north was made 
impossible by the icy solitudes of Lapland, and westward 
by the frontiers of firmly established states such as the 
German and Austrian Empires, the only way open to Russia 
was in the direction of the south. The decadence of Turkey 
seemed to offer her a splendid opportunity for such purposes. 



2 RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY IN THE EAST 

Diplomats from'the Neva dreamed of the Black Sea, Marmo- 
ra Sea, and Aegean Sea, becoming Russian lakes. And since 
Russia as the chief political representative of the Greek 
Church feels that there exists an historic connection bet- 
ween her and the former Eastern Roman Empire, she has 
always coveted the restoration of Constantinople as the 
metropolis of the Eastern Orthodox Church, and as the 
capital of her great empire. She longed for centuries to free 
that city, Tsarigrad (Tsar's City) from the yoke of the 
infidel, and to replace the crescent by the cross on the 
dome of St. Sophia. But, as the facts show, it was in this 
direction that her diplomacy, after some brilliant successes, 
found itself most completely deceived. 

During the Russo-Turkish War in 1804 under Tsar 
Alexander I, Russian armies were victorious, and after the 
war they occupied the Turkish Danubian principalities of 
Moldavia, Wallachia, and Bttlgaria. Occupation of these 
provinces lasted from 1806 to 1812. The rupture with 
Napoleon compelled the Tsar to sign the Peace of Bucharest 
by which of all his conquests he retained only a bit of 
Rumanian territory, Bessarabia, and two Danubian towns, 
Ismail and Kilia on the mouths of the Danube. The Ru- 
manians and Bulgarians fell again under the Turkish yoke, 
and Serbia, which won her independence with her own forces 
(1804 — 1812), was left to herself. Such a state of affairs in 
the Near East remained throughout the Napoleonic wars 
in Europe. (St. Stanoyevich, Istoriya Srpskoga Naroda.) 

The second intervention of Russia in the Near East occur- 
ed on the occasion of the Greek Revolution. In July 1827, 
Russia, France, and Great Britain, entered into concerted 
action by the Treaty of London. The united fleets of the 
three powers totally annihilated the Turkish and Egyp- 
tian fleets October 20, 1827, at Navarino, under Admiral 
Codrington. This decisive naval battle precipitated the 
Russo-Turkish War of 1828—1829, and weakened the 
resistance of Turkey against Russia. At that time the 



RUSSIA IN THE NEAR EAST 3 

French army continued to operate in the Morea to insure 
Greek independence, while the Russian Tsar Nicholas I 
took it upon himself to settle the rest of the Near Eastern 
Question. His European army again conquered the Danu- 
bian principalities, invaded Thrace, and entered Adrianople. 
In Asia his forces occupied Turkish Caucasia. By the 
Treaty of Adrianople, concluded in 1829, the autonomy 
of Rumania, Serbia, Bulgaria, and Greece, was guaranteed, 
but Russia did not secure any territory in Europe, except 
the isles of the Danubian delta. She also reserved for 
herself freedom of navigation in the Black Sea, and an open 
way through the straits of the Bosporus and Dardanelles. 
In Asia she secured a real territorial compensation by the 
acquisition of the northern part of Caucasia. 

The result of the Peace of Adrianople was to make Russia 
supreme at Constantinople. Later, in 1833, a new treaty 
was concluded between the ^Sultan and the Tsar, the Treaty 
of Unkiar-Iskelessi, which constituted a defensive and 
offensive alliance between the two powers, and established 
virtually a Russian protectorate over Turkey. Friendly 
relations between the two emperors lasted until 1852. In 
this year Russian prestige at the Porte began to decrease 
and the influence of England, France, and Austria to 
increase. Nicholas I sent his minister, Alexander Sergievich 
Menshikov, on a special mission to Constantinople, to 
obtain reparation in the form of a treaty which should 
guarantee the rights of the Orthodox Church in Palestine, 
and confirm the protectorate of Russia over all Ottoman 
Christians, established by the treaties of Bucharest and 
Adrianople. The Sultan opposed, and his resistance, supported 
by England and France, led Russia to the third intervention 
in the Near East, i.e., to the Crimean War. This war was 
terminated by the taking of Sevastopol (1855) and the Trea- 
ty of Paris (1856). By that important document Russia 
reluctantly consented to a strict hmitation of her arma- 
ments in the Black Sea, to withdrawal from the mouths of 



4 RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY IN THE EAST 

the Danube, by the retrocession of Bessarabia, and finally 
to a renunciation of all special rights of intervention between 
the Sultan and his Christian subjects. Tsar Nicholas did 
not live to experience this humiliation, as he died of grief 
before this treaty. His successor was Alexander II. 

The first decade of Alexander's reign is commonly 
kKown as the Epoka Velikih Reform, and may be described 
as a violent reaction against the political and intellectual 
stagnation of the preceding period. In respect of external 
policy, the reign of Alexander II differed widely from that 
of Nicholas I. The Eastern Colossus no longer inspired ad- 
miration and fear in Europe. Until the country had 
completely recovered from the exhaustion of the Crimean 
War the government remained in the background of 
European politics; the Russian minister of foreign 
affairs, Prince Gorchakov, graphically described its at- 
titude in the famous declaration: "La Russie ne houde pas, 
elle se recueille.'' ( Russia is not sulking, she is collecting 
herself ) . However, during this recovery Russia suc- 
ceded in 1871 to secure the suppression of article two of the 
Treaty of Paris, which limited her mihtary power in the 
Black Sea. Had the Tsar been satisfied with this success, 
which enabled him to rebuild Sevastopol and construct a 
Black Sea fleet, his reign might have been a peaceful and 
prosperous one. But he tried to recover the remainder of 
what had been lost by the Crimean War, the province of 
Bessarabia, and the predominant influence in Turkey. To 
effect this, he embarked on the Turkish War of 1877 , and 
so began the fourth intervention of Russia in the Near East. 

The R.usso-Turkish War of 1877, ended in severe dis- 
appointment for Russia. Though the campaign enabled 
her to recover Bessarabia, it did not increase her prestige in 
the Balkans. Serbia, Montenegro, Rumania, and Bulgaria, 
were increased territorially by this war, and completely 
liberated, but Russia took, so to speak, nothing for herself 
in Europe, because Austria-Hungary, Germany, and 



RUSSIA IN THE NEAR EAST 5 

England, modified her preliminary Treaty of San Stefano, 
at the Congress of Berlin, in favor of Turkey. Tsar Alexan- 
der II was especially irritated by the fact that the two 
powers that were thus depriving him of the fruits of his 
victories found means to slice off a share for themselves. 
Under the pretext of administering their affairs, Austria 
occupied Bosnia - Herzegovina, and by a separate treaty 
England secured the island of Cyprus, as well as a controlling 
situation in Anatolia. 

After thirty years of occupation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
the annexation of these two provinces by Austria-Hungary 
followed in 1908. Serbia and Montenegro protested to sig- 
natory powers. Sir Edward Grey declared that annexation 
violated and nullified the Treaty of Berlin. He arranged 
for a new European congress or conference to be held for 
the revision of the treaty. Baron Aehrenthal, Austrian 
foreign minister, refused the proposition, and consented to 
pay Turkey an indemnity of 65,000,000 francs. These 
negotiations took place in January and February 1909, and 
the protocol embodying the above terms between the two 
countries was signed on February 26. It was approved by 
Turkey on April 5, after a debate of nine hours in the 
Turkish chamber. 

Russia, weakened by the Japanese War and absorbed by 
constitutional reforms, was not at this time able to encourage 
Serbian and Montenegrin warlike agitations against Austria. 
She urged them to moderate their aspirations and to 
prepare for better times. The aggressive foreign policy of 
Austria now opened the eyes not only of the Balkan states, 
but also of Russia. Armaments and preparations for war 
began immediately after the annexation. In the work of 
restoring its military power the government was supported 
by the Duma. In this manner Russia counterbalanced the 
Austrian and German militarism which had been enormous- 
ly strengthened after the 9,nne?^ation of Bosnia-Herzegovina. 



6 RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY IN THE EAST 

Rivalry between Slavonic and Germanic powers for 
political preponderance in the Balkans, especially between 
Russia and Austria, was not new in European history. It 
existed even before the reign of Catherine II, and Joseph II 
of Austria. Russia strove to force her way to the great 
midland sea and obtain a footing in the world markets to 
which that commercial route leads. This egress from the 
dreary region of frost and ice to the lands of sunshine and 
fertility was ever felt as a prime necessity of national life. It 
is clear that for political and economic reasons, and notably 
for racial motives, Russia could never allow Constantinople 
to fall into the hands of any European power, nor could 
she allow the Balkans to fall under the ascendancy of 
Austria-Hungary or Germany. Austria-Hungary for her- 
self spoke in very much the same strain. In a leading Vien- 
na paper, one which usually reflects with fair accuracy 
the opinions of Ballplatz diplomacy, appeared on No- 
vember 5, 1908, an article which stated Austrian policy 
avowedly and frankly: 

"The thing is urgent, and we must be resolute. We 
cannot halt in the path marked out for us without 
incurring the most serious peril. We cannot return the 
sword to the scabbard until we have established on a 
secure basis our absolute supremacy in the Balkans, and 
crushed in those lands the influence of every other power. 
To accomplish this is essential. But we can only achieve 
this on condition that we border on Turkey, on the longest 
possible front. Especially must we establish ourselves on 
the border of Macedonia. The sine qua non for this is 
disappearance of Serbia and Montenegro; a conflict 
must be forced, and that speedily, on these countries. 
Ruthless selfishness is the only course that pays in 
politics. Ethical considerations should not affect the 
attainment of a political aim; to reach our aim no means 
must be despised." (Quoted by H. J. Darnton-Fraser in 
The Westminster Review, February, 1909.) 

It was obvious that Austria desired either to take Con- 
stantinople, or to prevent Russia from doing so. The 
acute tension in diplomatic relations between these two 



RtSSIA IN THE NEAR EASt f 

powers continued for several years. In 1912 Russia succeded 
in forming a Balkan League against Turkey. She favored 
a union of the Balkan Slavs with Greece, which would 
give her access to the southeastern ports in Aegean Sea. 
Austria opposed such a policy and desired to preserve the 
status quo, by which she hoped eventually to gain more 
Slavonic territory and to be united with her own Slavic 
dominions in a Trialism. This was a dream of Archduke 
Franz Ferdinand and his mihtaristic party. Russian policy 
in accord with the Triple Entente triumphed in the Balkan 
War. Serbia, Bulgaria, Greece, and Montenegro, increased 
territorially. Serbia captured Drach (Durazzo) on the Ad- 
riatic Sea, and insisted on retaining this seaport with a 
small strip of the adjacent coast , in order to have an outlet, 
"a little window," on the Adriatic, Russia and other powers 
of the Triple Entente actively sympathized with the Serbian 
claims; Austria and the Triple Alliance again opposed, 
especially Austria which had economic and political interests 
in Albania and did not desire to encounter Serbian compe- 
tition there. She insisted that new Albania, since, it 
manifestly could not remain Turkish, should be formed 
into an autonomous principality under her political 
protectorate. The state of European alliances caused 
Germany to champion the policy of Austria-Hungary, and 
brought France and Great Britain to the support of Russia. 
Only the earnest endeavors of all the foreign chancellories 
of Europe succeded in effecting a compromise of these 
conflicting purposes and thus temporarily preventing a 
general war. 

In 1913 there came the conflict between Bulgaria and 
her former allies, Serbia, Greece, and Montenegro, in 
consequence of the partition of territory gained in European 
Turkey. Austria without hesitation encouraged Bulga- 
ria in her demands, while the Russian Tsar telegraphed to 
the rulers of Southern Slavs to find some method to avoid 
a fratricidal war, reminding them of his position as arbitra- 



8 RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY IN THE EAST 

tor under the Balkan Treaty of 1912, and warned them 
that he would hold that state responsible which appealed 
to force. ''The state which begins war will be responsible 
to the Slavonic cause" — he said. In Vienna it was looked 
upon as an indirect assertion of moral guardianship of 
Russia over the Balkan states. The Austrian and German 
press insisted again that Balkan Slavs were of age and 
could take care of themselves; if not, it was for Europe, not 
for Oriental Russia, to control them. (Cf. Die Gegenwarty 
Berlin, March 8, 1913. ) 

The well-meant action of Russia in intervening in Balkan 
affairs had an effect opposite to that hoped for. The political 
horizon grew darker and darker, not only in the Balkans, 
but in all Europe. The Treaty of Bucharest of 1913, at the 
close of the second Balkan War, was concluded without 
much regard to the nationalities of the people in the dis- 
tributed territories, and still less regard for the political 
and economic interests of the individual states. By Aus- 
trian intervention Skadar (Skutari) was taken from Mon- 
tenegro and ceded to Albania, a state which Austria had 
just created. Serbia in particular, cut off for many years 
from the Adriatic and Aegean Sea, felt now that she had 
a wonderful opportunity to secure Drach, or some other 
seaport which would give her territorial and commercial 
access to the Mediterranean. But her desires were frus- 
trated and her political, economic, and national aspirations 
brought to naught. 

When we glance generally over Russia's foreign policy 
for a hundred years, from Alexander I in 1815, to Ni- 
cholas II in 1915, it is easy to see that all interventions, 
all the wars undertaken in the Near East, have ended in 
very meagre results. Four great wars against Turkey have 
brought Russia only a strip of Rumanian territory between 
the Dniester and the Pruth, and another Rumanian bit 
of land in the delta of the Danube. Even this last morsel, 
acquired in 1829 and restored in 1856, was won back in 1878 



RUSSIA IN THE NEAR EAST 9 

at the cost of 200,000 men lost in a terrible war. Russia, 
whose fleets have twice — at Navarino in 1827, and at 
Sevastopol in 1854 — annihilated the naval power of Tur- 
key, did not secure even an island in the Aegean Sea. 
In regard to satisfaction of a moral character, the 
Russian soldiers have never been able to enter Stambul, 
nor to pray in St. Sophia. As to gratitude upon the part of 
the liberated Balkan peoples, Matushka ( Dear-Mother ) 
was always rewarded with a series of disillusionments, which 
rewards mostly came from Bulgaria. 

The real gain for Russia in the Near East, as has been 
said, was slight as far as expansion was concerned. For 
a hundred years this powerful Northern Empire did not 
obtain one foot of territory in the Balkan Peninsula. But in 
the direction of the Caucasus, Persia, Afghanistan, Tur- 
kestan, Siberia, Mongolia, Manchuria, and China — • she 
made a real gain. Russia secured there an enormous increase 
of territory, and an aggrandizement of influence greater 
than what one might deem that she ever will have in the 
Balkans when a new day dawns after the present European 
Walpurgis night of slaughter. 



CHAPTER II 

RUSSIAiIN THE MIDDLE EAST. 

For a few parcels of territory in the West, conquered with 
tremendous difficulty, what bloody wars has Russia not 
endured? Her efforts to obtain access to the sea have been 
but half successful. The White Sea, blocked with ice; the 
Baltic, closed by the Sound and the Belts; the Black Sea 
closed by the Dardanelles; and the Mediterranean itself, 
with Gibraltar and Suez Canal, — are not available, and 
not sufficient for the needs of the expansion of a mighty 
continental empire. In Asia, on the contrary, by way of 
Persia, the Tigris, and the Persian Gulf, Russia is able to 
open her way to the Arabian Sea. Bismarck once spoke in 
disdain of the mission of Russia in Asia. But when young 
Emperor Nicholas II ascended the throne, he and his minis- 
ters took matters more seriously. In 1893 a Russian pubh- 
cist. Prince Ukhtomski, issued a book ( Puteshestvie na Vostok 
Naslednika Tsesarevicha), in which he stated with pride that 
the time had come for the Russians to have some definite 
idea regarding the heritage that the Genghis Khans and the 
Tamerlanes have left them. "Asia! we have been part of it at 
all times," he said; ''we have lived its life and shared its in- 
terests; our geographical position irrevocably destines us to 
be the head of the rudimentary powers of the Orient". 

The opinion of Prince Ukhtomski revealed a new element 
in Russian foreign poHcy. Gradually, step by step, town by 
town, and district by district, Russia won her influence 
in numerous khanates, amirates, satrapies, and other Asiatic 
provinces. She annexed Khiva in 1872, Bokhara in 1873, 



i 



RUSSIA IN THE MIDDLE EAST 11 

and Caucasus in 1878. She won political and commercial 
influence in Turkey, Afghanistan, and Persia. 

By these Russian successes in Asia, England was greaty 
alarmed. At every forward movement of the Muscovites, 
the Britons protested, or endeavored to secure guarantees 
against a new advance, or tried to gain for themselves some 
new strategic point that would strengthen their position. In 
1885 the belief was general that a war was about to ensue 
between **the Whale and the Elephant". But three years 
later. Great Britain agreed to the Russian occupation of 
Merv, Penjdeh, and Kushk. The Russians now were within 
one hundred miles of Herat — ''the Key of the Indies". 

The question of the settlement of the boundaries was 
scarcely disposed of, when another problem arose concerning 
the settlement of the boundaries of the Pamirs, a moun- 
tainous region of Central Asia lying on the northwest border 
of India. With the Bam-Dunya C'the Roof of the World") 
the platau of Pamirs commands both Afghanistan and Cash- 
mere, those two ramparts of India and Chinese Turkestan. 
The region was broken up into petty khanates over which 
the khan of Bokhara, the vassal of the Russians, and the 
amir of Afghanistan, the chent of the English, laid claim to 
sovereignty. Non of them had recognized until then the 
value of the territory. In the summer of 1891 a Russian 
scientific mission accompanied by six hundred soldiers, 
made its appearance in Pamir, and aroused, by its presence 
there, protests of the English. At the approach of winter, 
the Russians withdrew; but the following summer they 
again appeared there, under the command of Colonel Ya- 
nov. They contended that they had been insulted by the Af- 
ghans, for which they inflicted upon them the bloody defeat 
of Somatash, after which they fell back and took up their 
position at Kalabar on the Oxus. This clash of arms was 
succeded by a diplomatic controversy. It was not until 1895, 
after a keen discussion between the two great powers, each 
contending for its own client, that they reached an ag- 



12 RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY IN THE EAST 

reement. The disputed region was divided between Bokhara 
and Afghanistan, the former receiving the little khanates of 
Shugnan and Rushan, and the latter the khanate of Wakhan, 
a narrow strip of territory, about twent}^ miles wide, which 
now forms '' a buffer stat6" between Russia and Bri- 
tish India. 

In 1899 England occupied in Arabia the island of Perim 
in order to control the outlet of the Red Sea and establish 
a coaling station in her maritime route. Russia, in the same 
year, endeavored to obtain from the imam the grant of a 
coaling station on his coast. From this arose new com- 
plaints and strenuous opposition on the part of England, 
especially when Russia established herself on the coast, and 
at the very capital of the emperor of Abyssinia. 

The English began staidly to alternate between doubting 
and believing that these expansions of Russia by way of the 
Caucasus, by way of Turkestan, and by way of the Pa- 
mirs, were all directed towards one goal, to possess **the ri- 
ches of the Indies." Some English jingoists declared that 
the conquest of all the Levant was worthless for Russia, if 
it would not open the road to India. Russian diplomacy 
denied such innuendos. ''We do not desire India, but must 
get down to the Persian Gulf" — contended Novoe Vremya 
(April 28, 1901), a leading conservative Russian paper. In 
truth, what Russia desired was not a road to India, but 
a road to the Arabian Sea, and to reach that point the route 
lay through the Persian Gulf. She accepted the theory that 
in Asia there is room enough for two powers," if they find 
a modus operandi to move there in parallel lines without 
colUding. 

The modus operandi between the two rivals was not found 
until Germany compelled them to find it. The German plan 
for the Bagdad railroad was regarded for many years as an 
impracticable enterprise. But when a part of it was opened 
between Constantinople and Eregli in Central Turkey, and 
when Germany was preparing to continue the railway con- 



RUSSIA IN THE MIDDLE EAST 13 

struction with a terminus at Persian Gulf, England realised 
that the German Drang nach Osien was not illusion but fact* 
The basis for Anglo-Russian agreement in the Middle East 
was now found. Russia, not being at the zenith of her milita- 
ry and political effectiveness, condescended to an arrange- 
ment by which the situation in Persia and Afghanistan was 
cleared up. By this arrangement Great Britain consented to 
seek no political or commercial concessions north of a line 
connecting Kasrishirin, Ispahan, Yezd, Tabbas, and Khaf, 
with the junction of the Russian, Persian, and Afghan fron- 
tiers. Russia gave to Great Britain a like understanding in 
respect of the territory south of a line extending from the 
Afghan frontier to Birjand, Kirman, and Bander Abbas- 
The region between these two lines was to be regarded as a 
neutral zone in which either country might obtain conces- 
sions. It is of interest to note how Russia admitted the Bri- 
tish sphere of influence in the Persian Gulf, renouncing her 
claims in that part of Persia which she had coveted for so 
many decades. 

In Afghanistan the British and Russians reached an 
entente cordiale by which England was to exercise her 
influence in that amirate only in a pacific sense, viz., never 
to permit Afghanistan to take any measures threatening 
Russia. England also engaged neither to occupy nor to 
annex, in contravention of that treaty, any portion of Afgha- 
nistan, nor to interfere in the internal administration of the 
country. The statesmen of Russia, on their part, declared 
that they recognized Afghanistan as outside the sphere 
of Russian influence, and they agreed to conduct all 
their political relations with Afghanistan only through 
the intermediary of the British Government. In commercial 
relations the two governments affirmed their adherence to 
the principle of equal opportunity, and they agreed that any 
facilities which might have been, or should hereafter be, 
obtained for British and British-Indian trade, should be 
equally enjoyed by Russian trade and trader!^, 



14 RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY IN THE EAST 

This agreement, which was confessedly drawn up for the 
sake of a solid and lasting peace between the two em- 
pires concerned, evoked a mixture of sullen criticisms in 
the English and Russian press. It was said that certain 
stipulations of this convention did more harm than good 
to the British interests in the Middle Orient. Some English 
politicians objected that Russia obtained in Persia, for 
her sphere of influence, about two-thirds of the country, 
with its richest and largest towns, including Teheran the 
capital; that she had become indisputable master of the 
centres of trade, of the oldest and best routes in Persia; that 
in Afghanistan she had a free hand to let her officers confer 
with Afghan officers in '^ non-political" matters; and finally, 
that her appointed commercial agents in the amir's country 
would not promote or safeguard English interests in 
the matter of trrade. 

In Russia the compact was criticized only b}^ warm-water 
publicists of the forward polic}^ who alleged that the Eng- 
lish had no sincere intention in concluding such an agreement. 
It was England, they asserted, that had blocked the way of 
Russian efforts to reach the ocean; it was England that 
thwarted Russia's aim in the Crimean War to go to the 
Mediterranean. The.C averred it was Lord G. Curzon's 
firm Persian policy that arrested Russia's outflow to- 
wards a seaport on the Persian Gulf, which necessarily and 
properly was her right. The first Anglo-Japanese Treaty of 
1902, according to these contestants, was the death blow to 
the Russian Pacific open-water projects. Said convention 
does not grant Russia any outlook towards the Persian 
Gulf, the summum desiderium of her foreign policy in the 
Middle East, because she conceded to give up of her rail- 
road proposed from Meshed to Bander Abbas. 

There are other similar arguments yro and con this con- 
vention, but whatever they may be, the fact remains that 
the two signatorj^ powers were not compelled either bj^ 
threatening diplomatic complications to appeal to a peace 



RUSSIA IN THE MIDDLE EAST 16 

arbitration tribunal or by force of arms to sign a treaty of 
peace. They voluntarily and with earnest solicitude 
on both sides entered into the compact, to remove certain 
prejudice, mistrust, and resentment for injuries inflicted 
on each other in previous times. The Russian public in 
general, regarded England prior to this time as perfide 
Albion with whom it was not worthy to make any alliance 
or treaty. In the eyes of the English, Russia was considered 
as a semi-civilized nation ruled by autocrats and aristo- 
crats, which was known in Weltpolitik by her quick forget- 
fulness of given promises, and which is wholly built upon 
warfare and conquest. Such misunderstandings between the 
two powers had really existed for many decades, and these 
were removed by that agreement. 

To Persia, the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907 was 
more benevolent than some critics supposed. If the rivalry 
between England and Russia had remained as acute as it 
was in earlier times, Persia, with her constant troubles and 
her inefficiency for self-government, would have been 
plunged into civil war and finally become dismembered 
like an Asiatic Poland. 

At the beginning of the European War in 1914, and lat- 
terly in 1915, both Persia and Afghanistan were advised by 
Turks and Germans to take arms and overthrow the 
Russian and British protectorate. German and Austrian 
agents, taking advantage of their diplomatic immunity, 
attempted to convince Persia and Afghanistan that if they 
wished to preserve their national existence when the Euro- 
pean gigantic strife of nations ends, they must not remain 
neutral. **If England and Russia issue victorious in this 
war, then Persia and Afghanistan will be wiped off the map, 
and their national existence finished for ever" — wrote the 
Turkish paper Tanine of Constantinople. The British and 
Russian representatives complained that these Austro- 
German and Turkish agitations clashed with the rights of 
Russia and England as protecting powers of Persia and Af- 



16 RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY IN THE EAST 

ghanistan. Precautionary meusures against foreign in- 
trigues were taken immediately. Russia and Great Britain 
warned the Persian s/ia/i (''the King of Kings") and the 
Afghan amir that any act of hostility towards the British or 
Russian Empire might mean the end of independence of 
their respective countries. Fortunately for the shah and his 
people, all these foreign instigations failed of success, and 
Persia declined in 1914 and 1915 to join officially either 
belligerent party. 



CHAPTER III 
RUSSIA IN THE FAR EAST. 

In relation to the Far East, the contact of the Rus- 
sians with the Asiatic peoples has existed more than two 
hundred years, especially with China. From the annexation 
of the Kamchatka Peninsula, the position of Russia in 
the Far East continually grew stronger. In 1847 the Russian 
Government appointed for governor-general of Eastern 
Siberia, Count Nicholas Muraviev, who later was named, in 
reward for his services, Muraviev- Amurski. When Muraviev 
took this position he set himself to develop and strengthen 
the eastern colonies. He knew that his new province would 
have no future if it was not secured by the chief river and 
the richest region, that is, the Amur and Manchuria. 
In 1848 Russia sent an expedition of exploration to the Far 
East, but all this expedition perished without the escape of 
a single man to tell the story. 

Two years afterwards Captain Nevelski with his explo- 
rers discovered the island Sakhalin, occupied the mouth of 
the Amur, and gave a proclamation to the native Chinese 
mandarins that all this region belonged to "the White Tsar" 
at Petersburg. They protested and demanded that nego- 
tiations should be entered upon with their emperor. Gover- 
nor Muraviev declined the proposition because '' Peking was 
two far away, and Chinese diplomacy too slow." He 
continued to act as if the country was already a Russian 
province, and strengthened his position by building along 
the river the forts Aleksandrovsk, Khabarovsk, and Ni- 
kolaevsk. 



18 RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY IN THE EAST 

During the Crimean War the Anglo-French fleet blockaded 
the Russian Pacific coast, and destroyed a part of the 
military establishments there. This blockade, by threate- 
ning to starve out the colony, only hastened a decision 
on the part of Muraviev, who had need of Manchuria to 
furnish food for his colonists. In 1857 Admiral Putiatin 
dropped anchor in the Pechili Gulf, and proposed to the 
emperor of China, in consideration of Russia's armed inter- 
vention in the Taiping insurrection, the cession of Manchu- 
ria. China's only reply was a vigorous protest against this 
Russian encroachment. War seemed imminent between the 
two empires. Happily for the Russian eagle, just at 
that time came the Anglo-French expedition and the march 
of the allies upon Peking. The Russians profited by this 
event to complete the annexation of the coveted province. 
The Tsar sent a fleet into the Chinese waters, and the 
Celestials did not relish having a third European power to 
deal with. By the treaties of Aigun and Tientsin of 1858, 
they granted to Russia the entire left bank of the Amur, 
and all the territory between this river and the Pacific 
Ocean. In the southern part the Russians built a fort- 
ress and a city with a prophetic name Vladivostok (Do- 
minator of the East). The acquired lands formed two 
provinces, Amurskaya Ohlast (the Amur Province) west of 
the Amur, and Primorskaya Ohlast (the Maritime Province) 
east of that river. By the Treaty of Peking in 1860, China 
ceded to Russia the region adjacent to the lakes Balkhash 
and Issik-kul. The boundary line between Manchuria and 
Siberia was readjusted, and the Russians were granted the 
right to trade in all parts of the empire. Fifteen years after- 
wards Russia obtained from Japan the abandonment of the 
latter's rights over Sakhalin, in exchange for the North 
Kurile Islands. 

For nearly thirty years the boundary between China and 
Russia remained as agreed upon in the treaties of 1858 
and 1860; but already the commercial and political activity 
of the Russians was overstepping it. They had established 



RUSSIA IN THE FAR EAST 19 

themselves in large numbers in towns of Chinese Manchuria, 
in Kiakhta, Mukden, Kirin, and Tsitsihar. The navigation 
of the Ussuri and Sungari rivers fell wholly into their hands. 
The steamships of the Amur Company put Russia in rapid 
communication with Japan and San Francisco. Scientific 
missions traversed China in all directions. At Peking the 
Russian colony acquired a continually greater importance ; 
the ambassador of the Tsar wielded more influence at court 
than the representatives of any other European power. His 
open-handed liberality won him the favor of the courtiers, 
mandarins, and the generals. In all the sea and rivers* ports 
the colonies of Russian merchants multiplied, and these 
seemed to live on better terms with the native population 
than the traders of other foreign nations. 

In 1881 Russia secured great economic concessions and 
privileges in the provinces bordering on Siberia and Tur- 
kestan. By the Hi Treaty Russia and China agreed that no 
tariff was to be imposed by either of them, unless trade 
attains ''such development as to necessitate its establish- 
ment." Free trade, according to this treaty, was to be main- 
tained between all Chinese and Russian subjects in the 
principal towns and trading areas of Mongolia and Chinese 
Turkestan. Also, the treaty confirmed that Russian subjects 
had the right to settle and to acquire houses, for the pur- 
pose of carrying on trade in all trading places on either side 
of the Tianshan ranges and in the country outside the 
great Chinese Wall. 

By the convention of June, 1895, China contracted with 
Russia, through the intermediary of the Russo - Chinese 
Bank at Petersburg, and under the direction of Count 
Ukhtomski, a loan of four hundred million francs at four 
per cent., payable in thirty-six years. On August 27, 1896 
this same bank made another agreement with the Chinese 
Government (the Treaty of St. Petersburg). This trepty 
gave the Eastern Chinese Railroad Company the right to 
carry the Siberian railway through Chinese Mane huria 



20 RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY IN THE EAST 

and the Liaotung Peninsula, with a terminus at Talienwan 
and Port Arthur. Another purpose of the loan was to 
develop coal, iron, and gold mines in the territory traversed 
by the road. The stock of the company was held only by 
Chinese and Russians. A special clause authorized the Tsar 
to station in Manchuria both infantry and cavalry for the 
protection of the railroad, which at the end of twenty-five 
years was to revert to China, in case she desired it after 
having fulfilled all her obligations. Having secured the right 
to construct this line of railway. Count Cassini had little 
difficulty in inducing the Government of Peking to allow 
certain deviations of the road so as to bring it into touch 
with Tsitsihar, Kharbin, and Vladivostok. 

This matter was hardly settled between China and Rus- 
sia, before some other differences arose between China and 
Germany. On November 1, 1897, two German missionaries 
had been murdered by the Chinese ruffians in the province 
of Shantung. Such an outrageous act now gave a plausible 
pretext for the German Government to occupy the harbor 
of Kiaochow. For Russia this was a most unwelcome in- 
cident. She had intended Kiaochow for her own purposes, 
and had already made an agreement with the authorities in 
Peking that the harbor might be used freely by her fleet. 
The Cabinet of Petersburg hastened to demand, therefore, 
as an offset for the loss of Kiaochow, a lease of Port Arthur 
and Talienwan. The Chinese Government granted the 
demands, and the Russians now had free hand to use 
Port Arthur not merely as railroad station but as a place 
dfarmes. From the Korean Government they obtained a 
lease of the port of Masampo on the southeastern coast of 
Korea, and other concessions in this province. 

The Russian grandiose scheme in the Far East was very 
carefully laid, and for a time it was favored by many cir- 
cumstances. In 1900 the Boxer rising in China and the 
troubles in the town of Blagovieshchensk, justified Russia 
in sending a large force into Manchuria, to protect her own 



RUSSIA IN THE FAR EAST 21 

interests and at the same time the territorial integrity of 
the Celestial Empire against the inordinate demands of the 
western powers for compensations and guarantees. When 
the Boxer riots were silenced General Nicholas Grodekov 
telegraphed to his government of ''consolidating the great 
enterprise of annexing the whole of the Amur to Russia's 
dominions, and making of that river an internal waterway 
and not a frontier stream.'' His proposition was accepted as 
it concerned the right bank of the Amur. "The Son of Hea- 
ven" was assured that whatever might come to pass in 
Manchuria*' no part of China should be annexed to Russia". 
Moreover, Russian diplomats in Peking made with the 
Chinese Government a secret agreement (1900) by which 
Russia undertook to protect China from foreign invasion? 
and to dismantle all forts and defenses not occupied by the 
Russians. Niuchwang and other places, according to that 
agreement, were to be restored to the Chinese administraton 
when the Russian Government was satisfied that the 
pacification of the province was complete. 

The existence of such an agreement was denied by Count 
Lamsdorf , the Russian foreign minister, to both the British 
and Japanese ambassadors at Petersburg. But in spite of 
Count Lamsdorf's disavowal, this clandestine agreement 
with China on one hand, and the Russian general policy in 
Manchuria, on the other, excited suspicion in Japan and 
Great Britain. The hostility of the Japanese was stirred up 
on political grounds, while the English were jealous to see 
such a mighty rival as Russia in the Far East. For that 
reason, both powers, Japan and England, astonishing the 
world, signed in January, 1902, a treaty for maintaining the 
status quo and general peace in the extreme Orient. The trea- 
ty provided that the integrity of China and Korea must be 
respected, and the policy of open door for commerce and in- 
dustry in China and Korea should be granted to all nations. 

One of the first effects of this Anglo-Japanese Alliance 
was to strengthen the hands of the peace party in Russia, 



22 RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY IN THE EAST 

resulting in a new treaty with China (March 26, 1902), 
pledging the Russians to withdraw from Manchuria. The 
evacuation was begun shortly afterwards and continued 
during the winter. But in the spring of 1903, this process 
stopped. The Japanese now felt that it was high time to 
intervene. Accordingly, in Jul}^ 1903, they addressed an 
inquiry to Count Lamsdorf, asking whether he was disposed 
to reopen the negotiations on the Manchurian and Korean 
questions. The Russian Government vouchsafed a reply in 
which it was stated that Russia was willing to recognize the 
preponderating commercial interest of Japan in Korea, 
as well as her right to advise and assist that country in 
civil administration. Japan was further to be at liberty to 
send troops for this purpose to **the Hermit Kingdom'' 
after giving notice to Russia. Both powers were to agree not 
to use the territory of this kingdom for strategic purposes 
and not to erect any fortifications on the coast calculated to 
impair the freedom of the straits of Korea. The question 
of Manchuria was not brought into this scheme, because the 
Russian Government regarded this province to be outside 
of the Japanese sphere of interest. The answer did not sa- 
tisfy Baron Kamura, the Japanese minister of foreign af- 
fairs. After six months of dilatory wranglings, diplomacy 
had exhausted itself. The war began on February 8, 1904, 
without any formal declaration. 



CHAPTER IV 

RUSSIAN POLICY AFTER THE JAPANESE WAR. 

A great deal of nonsense has been written and accepted as 
true concerning; the Russo-Japanese War of 1904. Through- 
out the course of this terrific conflict, the Japanese took 
the best of care to put their own view of the case before 
the world. ''The wonderful heroism," ''the marvellous 
strategical and tactical skill," "the perfect medical and 
transport arrangements of the Japanese forces," and other 
set phrases received more than a fair share of praise. This 
was due to the perspicuous industry of the Japanese publi- 
city agencies. Those who believe in such laurea verba forget 
that Japan had advantage of Russia in being better prepared 
for the war; she was equipped with a full war-chest, a ve- 
teran army and navy. In the meantime the Russians fought 
under the dispiriting conditions of having a well-trained 
enemy in the far front and nearly all the European powers 
behind. Austria, Germany, Italy, and Great Britain 
intrigued secretely against Russia, especially Austria and 
Germany. Furthermore, in internal policy the vast Slavonic 
Empire was threatened by a revolutionary movement. The 
Russian Government was hampered at every turn by dis- 
orders. Nevertheless, in the battlefield the Russians put 
up an extraordinary fight, so that before a year and half had 
passed their adversaries were completely exhausted. The 
Japanese now unofficially suggested to the President of the 
United States of America that he intervene as mediator. 
President Roosevelt accepted the suggestion, and his 
mediation worked successfully. The treaty of peace between 



24 RUSSIAN POLI Y AFTER THE JAPANESE WAR 

Russia and Japan was concluded September 5, 1905, at 
Portsmouth, New Hampshire. 

Since the close of this unfortunate war the position 
of Russia, however, was not doomed either in Asia or in 
Europe. Russian policy in the Far East was generally more 
successful than in the Near East. The great secret of this 
success lay on the method employed in Russian dealings 
with the Asiatic peoples. Prof. Reinsch observes in his 
suggestive book, World Politics, that the Russians have 
an insinuating manner and great tact in diplomatic inter- 
course. In their Oriental political system they know how to 
use that splendor and concentrated majesty which impress 
the Oriental mind far more than do the simple business 
methods of the Britons. The Russian diplomats understand 
very well how to use the amour-propre of their adversaries. 
They know when to use force, and when to soothe up with 
gracious audiences, Lucullan banquets, and blandishments. 
Withal, the policy of Russia is persistently opportune and 
constant. The changes in ministry of foreign affairs are not 
so frequent as in France, England, and United States of 
America. From 1815 to 1882 Russia had only two ministers 
for foreign affairs, Nesselrode and Gorchakov; and since 
the latter date there have been only six, De Giers, Lobanov, 
Muraviev, Lamsdorf, Izvolsky, and Sazonov. This per- 
manency in the foreign office ensures continuity of the same 
political views and consistence in realizing them. Russia 
secured in Asia lands and influence among Oriental nations 
only by her peaceful persistency, not by belicose means. 
Russian policy in Far Assia showed that great conquests 
can be achieved not only by the land battles and sea fights, 
by brag proclamations, and oratorical heroics, but rather 
by silence and prudence. 

Of like opinion is Prof. James Mavor. In his Economic 
History of Russia, the English scholar assumes that Central 
Asia and the Far East contain imense possibilities for Rus- 
sia. At the present time she has privileges and concessions to 



RUSSIA IN THE FAR EAST 25 

exploit the mining industries and construct the railroads 
in Manchuria and all Mongolia. According to Prof. Ma- 
yor, the latter has already become in reality her prote- 
gee under the Russo-Mongolian Agreement and Protocol 
of 1912. China now controls solely the external relations 
of that province. All internal administration is left to the 
local khans, whose chief spiritual ruler is the khutuktu 
(saint) ; and this "saint" is simply a vassal of the Slav Tsar. 

Though preocupied with political and civilizing mission in 
the Far Orient, Russia did not abandon her liberating 
mission in Central and Southeastern Europe. When in 
May, 1912, Mr. S. Sazonov made a speech in the Duma, 
he declared, amongst other statements, in the reverse of 
Prince Ukhtomski's opinion, that Russia is not an Asiatic, 
but a European power. ''Our State was put together 
not on the banks of the Black Irtish, but on the Dnieper 
and the Moskva" — he asserted. This diplomatic usus 
loquendi translated into plain language signifies that expan- 
sion in Asia should not constitute the one sole aim of the 
foreign poHcy of Russia, for she has to protect, not only 
3,000,000 of Mongols from unremittng Chinese raids, but 
she has also to protect 50,000,000 of her minor brethren, 
the Slavonic peoples under the domination of Austro- 
Germans. Situated upon the outskirts of Europe, in 
the debatable region between the West and East, she is 
the conecting link between Occidental civilization and 
Oriental barbarism. The double eagle of Russia is the 
symbol that connects the Slavonic fragments in a racial 
bond which will spell in future peaceful progress and not 
war. The aims of this empire, whether in the Near, Mid- 
dle, or Far East, are nowadays mainly cultural. They are 
commercial and political only in so far as the geographical 
situation of Russia makes it incumbent on her statesmen to 
maintain her territorial integrity, and to provide for the 
normal expansion of her industrial and agricultural output. 

From 1908 onwards, Russian statesmen concentrated 
their attention and energies on everything relating to the 



26 RUSSIAN POLICY AFTER THE JAPANESE WAR 

Slavonic affairs, and gave their diplomatic support to all the 
Balkan Slavs. They encouraged the Panslavonic societies in 
Moskva and Petrograd to help the Western and Southern 
Slavs when these needed such help. The formation of the 
Balkan League of 1912 was their deed. And, as it is known, 
the Balkan League was not created for conquests of new 
territories, for subjection of other peoples, for national 
or international brigandage and booty. The Balkan Slavs 
made this union, with the assistance of their sister country, 
Russia, for the defense of their own soil, for hberation of 
their kinsmen, the subjugated ray as, who were under the 
brutal Asiatic oppressor — the red Sultan! For six hundred 
years Turkish janissaries plundered, persecuted, and mas- 
sacred the Christian population in the Balkan Peninsula. 
No European state had raised its voice against these Mu- 
sulman carnivals of crime. The only state sympathising 
with the sufferers was the Empire of the Tsars. Russ shed 
his blood on more than one occasion for the rescue of his 
underling brother from a galling yoke. And, as already noted 
in the first chapter, he secured nothing for himself, but 
only fought to assuage the downtrodden and humiliated 
peoples; he fought for justice and humanity. 



In the Far Orient Russia had many diplomatic adven- 
tures; most of them were successful, but a few very dis- 
astrous. The dehdcle occasioned by the Japanese War 
marked a decisive moment in her contemporary history. 
As a prominent Slavic economist, M. A. Finn-Yenotaevski, 
remarked in his work, Sovremennoe Khoziaystvo Rossiyi 
(The Modern Economy of Russia), for the last eight or ten 
years *'the eyes of the Muscovite eagle were turned from 
the East towards the West, and above all from the Far 
East to the Near East." Austria's systematic provocations 
in the Balkans, and her insolent attacks on Serbia and 
Croatia, together with German commercial competition in 
the Levant, forced Russia to recoil from the Far Orient, in 



RUSSIA IN THE FAR EAST 27 

order to prevent further encroachments of the Teutons, and 
their "Pressing towards the East." If 35,000,000 of the 
Western Slavs (the Poles, Czechs, Slovaks), and 15,000,000 
of Southern Slavs (the Serbians, Croatians, and Slovenes) 
enslaved at present time, would be delivered after this 
bloody European Armageddon they should be grateful not 
merely to the Matushka-Rossiya, but even to their foes. 
Their eternal enemies hastened the solution of the old 
Eastern Question. By the declaration of war to Serbia and 
Russia in 1914, Austria-Hungary, Germany, and Turkey, 
unconsciously made an ample contribution to the liberation 
of the Slavonic Laocoon who has wrestled for centuries 
with the Hun and Teuton serpents. 



APPENDIX. 



BIBLIOGRAPHY 

(Utilized documents and works). 

The literature of Russian history and politics is practi- 
cally inexhaustible. The following bibliography is limited 
to those documents and works which have direct bearing 
on the subject as outlined in this essay, thereby avoiding 
the confusion that results when there is an overhelming 
mass of material to be examined. For the spirit of the Rus- 
sian politics the student must consult all kinds of politi- 
cal literature, the blue, white, green, red, yellow, and 
orange books; the Russian year books; diplomatic cores- 
pondence; pamphlets; magazine articles, and even the 
newspapers. These are, of course, too numerous and too 
fluctuating in character to be catalogued. Herewith we list 
only the most important sources and treatises. 

CHAPTER I 

A) Official Documents. 

Traits d^ armistice entre la Russie et la Porte Ottomane, signe 
k Slobosia, le 24 aout, 1807. (''Recueil de Principaux 
Traites," par Geo. Fred, de Martens, pp. 689—692, 
t. VIII. Gottingue, 1835). 

Convention d* armistice entre la Turquie et la Serhie, signe a 
Brakni, le 17 ao^t 1808. (Idem, "Nouveau Recueil de 
Traites," p. 88, t. I. Gottingue, 1817). 

Traite de Paix entre la Russie et la Porte Ottomane, signe k 
Bucharest, le 28 mai 1812. (Ibidem, pp. 397—405, 
t. III. Gottingue, 1818). 



30 APPENDIX 

Treaty for the Settlement of Greece, between Great Britain, 
France, and Russia, with an additional and secret 
Article. July 6, 1827. French and English text. (Ibidem, 
pp. 282-290, t. VI. Gottingue, 1829). 

Traite de Paix entre la Russie et la Porte Ottomane. 
signe a Adrianople, le 14 septembre 1829. ( Ibidem, 
pp. 143-155, tome VIII. Gottingue, 1831). 

Traite d* Unkiar-I skelessi entre la Russie et la Porte Otto- 
mane. Constantinople, le 8 juillet 1833. (Ibid. pp. 655-661, 
tome XI. Gottingue, 1837). 

Traite General de Paix, entre TAutriche, la France, la 
Grande-Bretagne, la Prusse, la Russie, la Sardaigne, 
et la Porte Ottomane. Paris, le 30 mars 1856. (Ibidem, 
''Nouveau Recueil General de Trates," tome XV, 
pp. 770-781. Gottingue, 1857). 

Traite conclu dLondres, le 13 mars 1871, entre TAllemagne, 
I'Autriche, la France, la Grande-Bretagne, I'ltalie, la 
Russie, et la Turquie, pour la revision des stipulations 
du Traite conclu a Paris le 30 mars 1856, relatives a la 
navigation de la Mer Noire et du Danube. (Ibidem, 
tome VIII, pp. 303-306). 

Prdiminaires de Paix entre la Russie et la Porte Ottomane. 
San Stefano, le 3 mars 1878. (Ibidem, pp. 246-56. 2e serie, 
t. III. Gottingue, 1878). 

Traite de Berlin, entre TAllemagne, Autriche-Hongrie, 
France, Grande-Bretagne, Italie, Russie, et Turquie, 
signe le 13 juillet 1878. (Ibidem, pp. 449-465). 

Protocoles du Congris, reuni a Berlin du 13 juin au 13 juillet 
1878. (Ibidem, pp. 276-448). 

Protocol between Austria- Hungary and Turkey concerning 
Bosnia- Herzegovina, signed February 26, 1909. (See 
''Supplement to the American Journal of International 
Law," pp. 286-289, vol. 3, 1909). 



BIBLIOGRAPHY 31 

Treaty of Friendship and Alliance between the Kingdom 
of Bulgaria and the Kingdom of Serbia, signed at Sofia, 
February 29, 1912. (Ibidem, pp. 1-11, vol. 8, 1914). 

Treaty of Alliance and Defense between Bulgaria and Greece, 
signed at Sofia, May 16, 1912. (Ibidem, pp. 81-85)* 

Treaty of Peace between Turkey and the Balkan Allies, signed 
at London, May 30, 1913. (Ibidem, pp. 12-13). 

Treaty of Peace between Bulgaria and Rumania, Greece, 
Montenegro, and Serbia, signed at Bucharest, Jul. 28, 1913 
(Ibidem, pp. 13-27). 

B) Principal Works. 

Bernhardi, F. Th. Geschichte Russlands und der Euro- 
paeischen Politik in den Jahren 1814-1831, v. I-III. 
Leipzig, 1863-1877. 

Brandes, G. Impressions of Russia. London, 1890. 

Cheradame, And. Douze Ans de Propagande en Faveur des 

Peuples Balkaniques. Paris, 1913. 
Dolgorukov, P. V. La Verite sur la Russie. Paris, 1860. 

Dzhanshiev, Gr. Epoha Velikih Reform. Moskva, 1900. 
Gershenzon, M. O. Epoha Nikolaya I. Moskva, 1910. 
Golovachev, A. A. Desiat Liet Reform, 1861-71. Pet. 1872. 
Gourdon, E. Histoire du Congres de Paris. Paris, 1857. 
Hamley, E. The War in the Crimea. London, 1891. 

Howard-Flanders, W. Balkania, a short History of the 
Balkan States. London, 1909. 

Immanuel, F. La Guerre des Balkans de 1912, v. I-III. 
Paris, 1913. 

Istoriya Rossiyi v XIX Viekie, t. I-IX. Izd. T-va Br. A. I. 
Granat i Komp. Moskva, 1907-1910. 

Kovalevskiy, Maksim M. La Regime Economique de la 
Russie. Paris, 1898. 

La Russie a la Fin du XIXe Sihcle. Paris, 1900. 

Krasinski, V. Panslavism and Germanism. London, 1848. 
Lacroix, Paul. Histoire de la Vie et du Regne de Nicolas I, 
Empereur de Russie, 2e ed. Paris, 1869. 

Latimer, El. W. Russia and Turkey in the XIX Century, 
6 ed. Chicago, 1903. 



33 APPENDIX 

Leger, L. Russes et Slaves. Paris, 1896. 

Lowe, Charles. Alexander III of Russia. London, 1895. 

Mallat, Jos. La Serbie Contemporaine, v. I-IL Paris, 1902. 

Marx, Karl. The Eastern Question. London, 1897. 

Miller, William. The Balkans. London, 1911. 

Mijatovics, E. L. The History of Modern Serbia. Lon. 1872. 

Morfill, W. R. A History of Russia. London, 1902. 

Novikoff, Olga (0. K.) Skobeleff and the Slavonic Cause. 
London, 1883. 

Pokrovskiy, M.N. Ruskaya Istoriya s Drevnieyshih Vremen^ 
2d ed. V. I-V. Moskva, 1915. 

Rain, Pierre. Un Tsar Ideologue, Alexandre I. Paris, 1913. 
Rambaud, Alfred. Histoire de Russie. English translation 
by L. B. Lang. Boston, 1886. 

Ranke, Leopold. A History of Serbia. London, 1847. 

Russell, Sir William H. The British Expedition to the Crimea, 
London, 1877. 

Samson-Himmelstjerna, Herman. Russia under Alexan- 
der III. Translated from the German. New York, 1893. 

Sentupery, Leon. UEurope Politique, t. III. Paris, 1895. 

Skrine, Francis Henry. The Expansion of Russia , 1815-1900. 

Cambridge, 1903. 
Stanoyevich, St. Istoriya Srpskoga Naroda. Beograd, 1910. 
Stevenson, F. S. A. History of Montenegro. London, 1913. 
Taburno, I. P. Vopros o Raspredieleniy Zavoyevanoy v 

Turtsiy Teritoriy mezhdu Bolgariey i Serbiey. Pet. 1913. 
Tatishchev, S. S. Vnieshniaya Politika Imperatora Nikola- 

ya I. Peterburg, 1887. 

Iz Proshlago Ruskoy Diplomatiyi. Peterburg. 1890. 

Imperator Aleksandr II. Peterburg, 1912. 

Thompson, H. N. Russian Politics. London, 1895. 
Tikhomirov, L. A. Russia, Political and Social. Lond. 1892. 

Urquhart, David. Progress of Russia in the West, Northy 

and South, 4 ed. London, 1853. 

Recent Events in the East. London, 1854. 

Vandel, A. Napoleon et Alexandre I, 6e ed. Paris, 1900-1907. 
Yakschitch, Gregoire. UEurope et la Resurrection de la 

Serbie. Paris, 1907. 



BIBLIOGRAPHY S3 

CHAPTER II. 

A) Official Documents. 

Treaty of Gulistan, signed between Russia and Persia, 
October 12, 1813. (Appendix in Krausse's "Russia in 
Asia." pp. 332-5. London, 1899). 

Treaty of Turkomanchai, signed between Russia and Per- 
sia, February 21, 1828. (Ibidem, pp. 336-41). 

Correspondence settling the Russo-Afghan Frontier of 1872. 
(Ibidem, pp. 344-6). 

Treaty of Khiva, signed between Russia and Khiva, 
August 24, 1873. (Ibidem, pp. 347-50). 

Treaty of Bokhara, signed between Russia and Bokhara, 
September 28, 1873. (Ibidem, pp. 351-3). 

Akhal- Khorassan Boundary Convention, signed between 
Russia and Persia, Dec. 21, 1881. (Ibid. pp. 360-2). 

Russo-Afghan Boundary Convention, agreed at St. Peters- 
burg, July 10, 1887. (Ibidem, pp. 363-72). 

Convention between Great Britain and Russia, with regard to 
the sphere of influence of the two countries in the re- 
gion of the Pamirs. March 11, 1895. (Ibid. pp. 373-4). 

Convention between Great Britain and Russia, containing 
arrangements on the subject of Persia, Afghanistan, and 
Tibet, signed on August 31, 1907. ( ''Supplement to the 
American Journal of International Law," pp. 398-406, 
vol. I, 1907). 

Agreement between Germany and Russia, relating to Persia, 
St. Petersburg, Aug. 19, 1911. (lb. p. 120, v. 6, 1912). 

B) Principal Works. 

Albrecht, Max. Russisch Central Asien. Hamburg, 1896. 

Baddeley, John. The Russian Conquest of the Caucasus, 

London, 1908. 
Baxter, W. E. England and Russia in Assia. London, 1885. 

Bouillane de Lacoste, E. Around Afghanistan, Lond. 1909. 

Browne, E. G. The Persian Revolution of 1905-1909. 

Cambridge, 1910. 
Colquhoun, A. R. Russia against India. London, 1900. 



84 APPENDIX. 

Curzon, G. N. Russia in Central Assia, in 1889, and the 
Anglo- Russian Question, 2d ed. London, 1889. 

Persia and the Persian Question. London, 1892.). 

Hamilton, Angus. Afghanistan. London, 1906. 

Hej^elder, O. Transkaspien and seine Eisenhahn. Leip. 1889. 

Kostenko, Lev. Turkenstanskiy Kray. Peterburg, 1880. 

Krahmer, (Gustav). Russlandin Mittel-Asien. Leipzig, 1898. 

Die Beziehungen Russlands zu Persien. Leipz. 1903. 

Krausse, Alexis. Russia in Asia. London, 1899. 

Marvin, Charles Th. The Russians at the Gates of Herat, 
New York, 1885. 

Maslov, A. Zavoevanie Akhal-Teke. Peterburg, 1882. 

Olufsen, 0. The Emir of Bokhara and his Country. Copen- 
hagen, 1911. 

Popowski, J. The Rival Powers in Central Asia. Lond. 1897 

Reclus, El. Geographie Universelle, t. V. Paris, 1880. 

Rossbach, Paul. Die Russische Weltmacht in Mittel- und 
Westasien. Leipzig, 1904. 

Shuster, W. M. The Strangling of Persia. New York, 1912. 

Ukhtomskiy, E. E. Puteshestvie na Vostok Nasliednika 

Tsesarevicha. Peterburg, 1893. 
Vambery, Armin. History of Bokhara. London, 1873. 

Western Culture in Eastern Lands. London, 1906. 

Whigham, H. J. The Persian Problem. New York, 1903. 

CHAPTER III 

A) Official Documents. 

Traits de Commerce entre la Russie et la Chine, signe k 
Kouldja, le 25 juillet 1851. C'Nouveau Recueil Gene- 
ral de Traites," par G. F. de Martens, pp. 176-180, 
tome XVII, partie 2. Gottingue, 1869). 

Train de Limites entre la Russie et la Chine, signe h Aighoun, 
le 16 mai 1858. (Ibidem, pp. 1-2. t. XVII, partie 1. 
Gottingue, 1861). 



BIBLIOGRAPHi 36 

Treaty of Peking, between Russia and China, signed No- 
vember 14, 1860. (Appendix in A. Krausse's ''Russia 
in Asia," pp. 342-43). 

Treaty of Hi, between Russia and China, signed Feb- 
ruary 12, 1881. (Ibidem, pp. 354-59). 

Manchurian Railway Agreement, concluded between the 
Chinese Government and the Russo-Chinese Bank, 
August 27, 1896. (Ibidem, pp. 375-83). 

Russo-Chinese Convention, respecting Port Arthur and 
TaHenwan, March 27, 1898. (Ibidem, pp. 384-86). 

Anglo-Russian Agreement, respecting sphere of influence 
in China, April 28, 1899. (Ibidem, pp. 387-8). 

B) Principal Works. 

Anspach, Alfred, La Russia Economique et VOeuvre de M, 
de Witte. Paris, 1904. 

Aulagnon, Claudius. La Siberie Economique. Paris, 1901 

Bates, Lindon W. The Russian Road to China. Boston, 1910. 

Beveridge, A. J. The Russian Advance. New York, 1903. 

Chirol, V. Far Eastern Question. London, 1896. 

Cotes, E. Signs and Portejits in the Far East. London, 1907. 

Curzon, G. N. Problems of the Far East. Westminster, 1896. 

Douglas, R. K. Europe and the Far East. Cambridge, 1904. 

Dyer, Henry. Japan in World Politics. London, 1909. 

Colder, F. A. Russian Expansion on the Pacific, 1641-1850. 

Cleveland, 1914. 
Hannah, Ian C Eastern Assia, a History. New York, 1911. 
Harrison, E. J. Peace or War, East of Baikal? Yokoh. 1910. 
Hart, A. B. The Obvious Orient. New York, 1911. 

Hishida, Seiji G. The International Position of Japan as a 
Great Power. New York, 1905. 

Krahmer, (Gustav). Russland in Ost-Asien. Leipzig., 1904. 

Sibirien und dieGrosse SibirischeEisenbahn. Lpz. 1900 

Das Nordoestliche Kuestengebiet. Leipzig, 1902. 

Die Beziehungen Russlands zu Japan. Leipzig, 1904. 

Krausse, Alexis. The Far East. New York, 1900. 

Lawton, Lsincelot. Empires of the Far East, v. I-II. Bost.1912. 

Leroy-Beaulieu, P. The Awakening of the East. N. Y, 1900. 

Litman, S. La Siberie et le Trans-Siberien. Paris, 1903. 



36 APPENDIX 

Little, Archibald J. The Far East. Oxford, 1905. 

Lowell, Percival. The Soul of the Far East. New York, 1911. 

Millard, T. F. The New Far East. New York, 1906. 

Norman, H. The Peoples and Politics of the Far East. Lon 1900 

Price, M. P. Siberia. London, 1912. 

Ravenstein, E. G. The Russians on the Amur. London, 1861. 

Rawlinson, H. England and Russia in the East. London, 1875. 

Reinsch, Paul S. World Politics. New York, 1904. ( ^ \n\iS\ 

Vasilliev, V. P. Otkritie Kitaya. Peterburo;, IdQJL-^ A^^ - ^ '^^] ' ) 

Vladimir ( John Foreman ?}^liussia on the Pacific, and 13^^'*'^ 

Siberian Railway. London, 1899. 

Weale, Putnam B. L. (B. Simpson). Manchu and Musco- 
vite. London, 1904. 

The Re-shaping of the Far East, v. I-II. London. 1905. 

Wright, G. F. Asiatic Russia. New York, 1902. 

CHAPTER IV 

A) Official Documents. 

Treaty of Peace between Japan and Russia, signed at Ports- 
mouth, September 5, 1905. (''Supplement to the Ame- 
rican Journal of International Law," pp. 17-22, v. 1 1907). 

Agreement between Russia and China regarding Manchuria. 
Peking, March 26, 1906. (Ibid. pp. 704-6, v. 4, 1910). 

Russo-Japanese Convention, concerning "open door" in 
China. July 30, 1907. (Ibidem, pp. 396-7, v. I, 1907). 

Sino- Japanese Peking Treaty, signed December 22, 1905. 
(Ibidem, pp. 396-97, v. I, 1907). 

Agreement between Russia and Mongolia, with accompanying 
Protocol, signed at Urga, Novem. 3, 1912. (lb. pp. 180-7) 

Analysis of the China- Japanese Treaties. Their Bearing on 
American Interests. By Geo. Bronson Rea. Pubhsher 
of "The Far Eastern Review." (Shanghai, 1915). 

China's Official History of the Recent Sino-J apanese Trea- 
ties. (Idem ? ). 

Sbornik Diplomaticheskih Dokumentov, Kasayushchihsia 
Sobitiy na Balkanskom Poluostrovie 1912-1913. Izdanie 
Ministerstva Inostrannih Diel. Peterburg, 1914. 



BIBLIOGRAPHY 37 

B) Principal Works. 

Albert, Louis. Paix Japonaise. Paris, 1906. 
Alexinsky, Gregor. Modern Russia. Transleted from the 
Russian, by Bernard Miall. London, 1913. 

— Russia and the Great War. Translated from the 

Russian, by Bernard Miall. New York, 1915. 

Blakeslee, George H. China and the Far East. N. York, 1910. 

Drage, Geoffrey. Russian Affairs. London, 1904. 

Finn-Yenotaevskiy, M. A. Sovremennoe Khoziaystvo Rossiyi 
Peterburg, 1914. 

Goodrich, J. K. Russia in Europe and Asia. Chicago, 1912. 

Kallash, V. Rossiya otSmuti do Nashego Vremeni. Mos. 1913 

Kovalevskiy, M.M, Istoriya Nashego Vremeni. Sovremen- 

niya Kultura i eya Prgblema. Peterburg, 1914. 
Martov, L. Obshchestvennoe Dvizhenie v Rossiyi v Nachalie 

XX Vieka. Peterburg, 1914. 

Martin, Rudolf Emil. The Future of Russia. Translated from 
the German. London, 1906. 

Mavor, James. An Economic History of Russia. N. Y. 1914. 
Miazgovskiy, E. A. IstoriyaChernomorskagoFlota 1696-1912. 

Peterburg, 1914. 
Miliukov, Pavel N. Russia and its Crisis. Chicago, 1905. 

Glavniya Techeniya Russkoy Istoricheskoy Misli. Ya- 

roslav, 1913. 

Ocherki po Istoriyi Russkoy Kulturi. Peterb. 1913. 

Ovsianik Kulakovskiy, D. N. Istoriya Ruskoy Intelligen- 

tsiyi. Peterburg, 1914. 
Ovsianiy, N. R. Blizhniy Vostok i Slavianstvo. Pet. 1913. 

Perry- Ascough, H. G. C. With the Russians in Mongo- 
lia. London, 1913. 

Pipin, A. N. Panslavism v Proshlom i Nastoyashchem. 
Peterburg, 1913. 



88 APPENDIX 

Plekhanov, G. V. Istoriya Ruskoy Ohshchestvenoy Midi. 

Peterburg. 1914. 
Seton- Watson, R. W. The Southern Slav Question and the 

Habshurg Monarchy. London, 1911. 
Tucic, Srgjan PI. The Slav Nations. London, 1915. 

Weale, Putnam B. L. The Truce in the East and its After- 
math. New York, 1907. 
The Coming Struggle in Eastern Asia. London, 1908. 

Wallace, D. Mackenzie. Russia. Revised and enlarged 
edition. London, 1912. 






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